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ON HUMANITY

AND ABORTION

In his interesting and informative paper, "Abortion and the Catholic Church:
A Summary History,"' John T. Noonan, Jr., presents a history of the views of
the Roman Catholic Church on abortion and goes on to argue in behalf of the
position that abortion is morally wrong. Noonan's argument, however, is open to
question on a number of grounds. In what follows I shall present a sketch of
his position, point out certain defects in his discussion, and then go on to offer
some suggestions aimed at solving the question of the moral status of abortion.
Since Noonan's argument is found in the concluding section of his paper, I will
limit my discussion to those pages.
Noonan's procedure is this: He assumes that, barring special circumstances,
it is morally wrong to take the life of a human being. The question concerning
the moral status of abortion becomes one of determining whether or not a fetus
in the womb is a human being; and if so, at what point he becomes a human
being. This leads him to take as the central question: "How do you determine
the humanity of a being?" (p. 125)
Next Noonan proposes that what has man's potential is human and concludes
that: "If you are conceived by human parents, you are human." (p. 126) According to this criterion, the fetus is a human being from the moment of conception, and therefore abortion is morally wrong. Noonan defends his position,
first, by considering and finding defects in a number of alternative criteria, and
then by presenting some positive considerations in behalf of his own view.
To begin, let us consider Noonan's arguments against criteria alternative to
the one he proposes. His arguments against these five proposed criteria are of
different sorts, and it is worthwhile noting them. Some of the arguments are
quite effective, others less so. Yet the reader has the feeling that, in one sense,
Noonan wins easily in each case; in fact, almost too easily. This should make
one suspicious about the entire dispute. (Later it will be suggested that the
reason for this feeling is that Noonan's arguments rest upon certain assumptions
which make his task easier. Once these assumptions are disclosed, as they are
once one asks not "How do you determine the humanity of a being?" but
"What sort of process is the proper one to use to determine the proper criterion
of humanity?" it becomes clear that much of what Noonan says must be supplemented before it can hope to be put forward as an adequate account of the
moral status of abortion.)
Noonan considers five alternative criteria:
First, viability. He points out a number of facts concerning viability, among
them that even after a child has been removed from the womb it cannot live
without care. He concludes that its being able to exist outside the womb, since
it marks no special lessening of dependence, "does not seem to signify any
special acquisition of humanity." (p. 126) This last phrase suggests that Noonan
considers humanity to be some sort of property or attribute which all and only
human beings possess and which is acquired at some definite time. (This point
will be returned to below.)
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His strategy is now a bit clearer: He assumes that the criterion of humanity
can be determined when we find the moment at which the fetus acquires this
attribute called "humanity." (Although Noonan intends to drop traditional
theological categories, it is important to note that he has not dropped the
metaphysical picture upon which many traditional theological views were based.)
Presumably, then, unless one can find a moment of acquisition between conception
and birth, he should conclude that the fetus has acquired its humanity at the
moment of conception. As will become clear below, Noonan's model of an
attribute acquired by a fetus in the real order of things at a given moment is not
the only, nor is it the most satisfactory, model of 'how human beings are human.
The second alternative criterion Noonan considers is couched in terms of
experience: Humanity requires experience; to be human is to have had experience. Noonan, after pointing out that in a sense the embryo does have
experience, goes on to argue that "it is not clear why experience confers
humanity." (p. 127) Here, it seems, is an argument reminiscent of G. E. Moore's
open-question argument: Humanity is one thing; experience is another. Therefore it is a mistake to think that to acquire one is to acquire the other. (Although
Noonan does at one point refer to rationality as the universal characteristic of
man [p. 129], one has the feeling that humanity for Noonan is, as good was for
Moore, unanalyzable.)
The third criterion he considers is feeling. He points out, however, that the
feelings of people about the deaths of others vary tremendously, depending upon
circumstances, and argues that lack of feeling about an embryo does not establish
lack of humanity. He does not, however, consider whether humans might come
to develop strong feelings about the death of embryos, and what effect this
would have oh their moral outlook. More importantly, he fails to mention a
related criterion: Supposedly when we discover an adult has been murdered we
feel some strong moral outrage or disapproval toward the murderer, but many
people feel no such thing toward an abortionist or the woman who obtains
an abortion. (This point will be considered below.)
The fourth criterion Noonan discusses is whether or not we can see or feel
the embryo. He dismisses this on the basis that to distinguish human beings by
sight might lead to discrimination on the basis of color and on the grounds that
one out of touch with others is not thereby deprived of his humanity. His
arguments here, if they can be called arguments at all, are certainly very weak.
Yet it is not clear that the criterion can be saved from the same sort of charge
Noonan made against the second criterion: What do seeing and touching have to
do with humanity?
Perhaps the most interesting of the criteria Noonan considers is that of social
visibility: recognition by society as a member of the society or as a human being.
He rejects this on the ground that "any attempt to limit humanity to exclude
some group runs the risk of furnishing authority and precedent for excluding
other groups in the name of the consciousness or perception of the controlling
group in the society." (p. 129) Noonan's view is that "humanity is an attribute,"
the acquisition of which is a "a real event in the objective order." He feels it is
conferred by conception by a man and a woman. (pp. 128-29)

JOHN O'CONNOR
Once again, we find Noonan's metaphysics determining his rejection of a
criterion. Since humanity is a real attribute objectively and independently of
whether or not it is recognized, any attempt to give society or other men the
power to determine who has humanity is very dangerous, for they may well err.
More importantly, to be human is to posses an attribute, not merely (or even)
to be recognized in a certain way by society.
Hence, Noonan's presuppositions can be seen fairly clearly now: Human
beings who have been born have some attribute called "humanity" which makes
them human. If one accepts these presuppositions, one must, in order to argue
against Noonan's view concerning abortion, accept the burden of proof. That
is, such a one must accept the burden of showing that the fetus when conceived
lacks the attribute known as humanity, or at the very least that it acquires it at
some point between conception and birth. As noted above, Noonan's arguments
against the various alternative criteria often embody the following moves: "Well,
that change is not great and important enough to mark the acquisition of humanity," and "Why should that other change mark humanity at all?" While many
of his arguments are effective even if one does not accept Noonan's presuppositions, they are almost too effective if one does accept the presuppositions.
Certainly most people would grant that an entity does not all of a sudden acquire
an attribute called humanity, in large part because many probably don't believe
in attributes, and would grant that no one change in the development of an
embryo marks the acquisition of humanity. But given Noonan's presuppositions,
these two admissions seem to be sufficient to prove his case about abortion. This
suggests quite strongly that his presuppositions need airing and examination.
However, before turning to an examination of them and the fundamental
question which underlies the issue of the moral status of abortion, let us consider
briefly Noonan's arguments on behalf of his view.
A. He realizes that his argument may be pushed further than he desires:
Since at the moment of conception a fetus has humanity, why not push the
process back to the stage before conception and rule out contraception, since
given that some spermatozoon and some ovum will produce a fetus, they are
potentially human, and therefore human. Noonan argues on this point that since
the probability that a spermatozoon or an ovum will develop is very small, while
the probability that a child will result, once conception occurs, is four out of
five, we should draw the line at the moment of conception. He defends this
view by an unusual and not terribly clear principle: "Moral judgments often rest
on distinctions, but if the distinctions are not to appear arbitrary fiat, they should
relate to some real difference in probabilities." (p. 129)
At least two comments should be made:
1) If in a given tribe, conception produces a child in only one out of ten
cases, is Noonan prepared to sanction abortion for this society? What if these
statistics were correct for the human race in general? Noonan's argument needs
amplification to take into account the weight of these possibilities.
2) What does a shift in probabilities, from an event being very unlikely to
an event being quite likely, have to do with humanity? This is of course the
same sort of argument Noonan used against experience as a criterion for human-
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ity. Certainly humanity has much more to do with experience, say, than with
biological statistics. This is not to claim that this argument is especially effective.
It is just that if one feels, as Noonan apparently does, that only a characteristic
which is dearly and intimately associated with humanity can be a mark of the
presence of humanity, he is open to this charge.
B. Noonan argues that at the moment of conception the new being receives
the genetic code, which makes him then potentially human. Noonan then goes
on to say that since man is always in the process of learning, no one is fully
human. So the adult as well as the fetus is potentially human. Therefore, supposedly, they should be treated alike.
If this is meant as a proof of some sort, it is fallacious. Presumably, Noonan's
interest in humanity arose because he was interested in determining the scope of
the moral principle that it is wrong to take human life. Even if one grants the
perhaps dubious assumption that a fetus and an adult are potentially human in
the same sense (are acorns and full-grown trees potentially oaks in the same
sense?), Noonan's procedure fails. His argument is this:
a) All A's (humans) are B's (potential humans).
b) All C's (fetuses) are B's (potential humans).
c) It is morally wrong to kill A's.
d) It is morally wrong to kill C's.
This is like arguing that since it is wrong to kill humans, it is equally wrong to
kill kangaroos, since both humans and kangaroos are bipeds. While, of course, a
fetus and an adult of the same species are in a sense more closely related than
members of two different species, nothing Noonan says shows the relevance of this
relation. Hence, as a purported proof, Noonan's attempt fails.
It appears, therefore, that Noonan's own criterion is subject to the same sorts
of attack that he subjects alternative criteria to. The effectiveness of all of these
attacks exemplifies what was noted before: Noonan's attacks are almost too
successful. The reason is now clear. Noonan has presupposed a certain account
of the facts to which the proper criterion of humanity must relate: Humanity
is an attribute which is acquired at some definite time. Since there seems to be
no "jump" in the development of a fetus into a human being, and further since
there is no special feature which seems an intuitively correct indicator of the
presence of humanity, we must assume that the fetus is human at conception.
However, the metaphysical assumptions contained in this view are open to
serious question. For example, it is very difficult to give a coherent and clear
account of attributes, especially when the presence of such attributes is supposed
to qualify a being as within the scope of a moral judgment. Hence, Noonan's
argument, if it is to be effective and persuasive to a great number of philosophers,
must be freed from its metaphysical underpinnings.
This leads to a question noted above: "What sort of process is the proper
one to use to determine the proper criterion of humanity?" That is, how does
one set about answering Noonan's question "How do you determine the humanity
of a being?" Noonan seems to assume that the criteria are to be discovered,
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because whether or not a being is human is a fact independent of our recognition
of it. However, it is possible to agree with Noonan that, in a sense, it is certainly
an objective matter whether or not a being is human, but point out that it
becomes objective only when human beings have decided what the criterion of
humanity is. Noonan assumes that there are a right and a wrong in the matter of
a criterion. Either the criterion picks out human beings or it doesn't, and whether
or not it does is independent of human beings thinking it does. However, Noonan
cannot argue that the criterion is correct only if it yields the result that fetuses
are human, since the point of seeking the criterion was to determine whether or
not fotuses are hmnan. litNoonaln's article, then, we fail to find, apart from
a brief reference to rationality, which is insufficiently elaborated (p. 129), any
standards by which to evaluate the proposed criteria of humanity, except negative
ones. Sine,' these negative ones seem to rule out, given Noonan's "objectivist"
metaphysics, all candidates (including his own), it appears that if the question
of humanity is to be settled in a way that throws light on die moral status of
abortion, a new approach to the question is needed.
I suggest that the fundamental defect in Noonan's account is his assumption
that the criterion of humanity needs to be discovered. Rather I suggest that we
must decide what the criterion is to e. 2 This is not, of course, to say that it is
a subjective matter. Rather, there are good and bad reasons for deciding in the
way we do. It would be impossible, of course, in a paper such as this to work
out a complete account of the grounds upon which we should decide criteria of
liuninanity. Indeed there may never be total agreement on such grounds, let
alone on a choice of criterion. The possibility of disagreement here may be .unfortunate at times, but the same possibility exists with respect to science or any
human activity. Still some comments will be offered.
The reason that humanity is of interest to a person concerned with the moral
status of abortion is that he wants a way to decide the scope of the moral principle to the effect that the taking of human life is wrong. Hence humanity
should be characterized in terms of those features which are in fact related to
the moral sensibility of humian beings. 'l'iere may of course be reason to adopt
criteria of humanity for other purposes, e.g., for biological purposes. There is
no need to assume, however, that all criteria of humanity will be the saine. It
will do little good to couch the criterion of humanity in such a way that the
moral judgments we now make concerning human beings would be felt to have
no moral force when applied to the "newly qualified" humans, whose humanity
was first recognized only by the- new criterion of humanity. To take a trivial
case, it would be pointless to set tip a criterion of humanity, to be used in a
moral context, according to which trees were human, for no one in our society
at least feels that killing a tree is anything like killing a human being. This is
not to say that one's society is to determine who is human, in the sense that
some dictator has the power to set up the criterion. It is rather to say. that
psychological features of human beings, especially those that relate to value
2 For a similar point, in the cotext of a discussion concerning robots, see Hilary
Putnamu, Robots: Machines or Artificially Created Lile? 61 THi JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
660-91 (1964).
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judgments in general and moral judgments more particularly, must be taken
into account in framing any such criterion if it is to be morally effective.
This point was indicated earlier, when it was noted that Noonan failed to
include among the alternative criteria that which would distinguish humans
from nonhumans by determining the moral reaction men have to the one who
takes the life of the being in question. One who intentionally kills an adult or
a child, except in special circumstances, is usually held to be morally reprehensible. Perhaps also one who intentionally kills a child in the womb at seven
months. However, many do not feel that a person who performs an abortion
on a woman who is one or two months pregnant is morally reprehensible in the
way that one often considers the killer of an adult to be. Here is a psychological difference which may be taken to have a moral dimension and therefore may be taken to be relevant to the moral status of abortion.
Assuming this account of moral sentiment as roughly correct (from a psychological point of view), one might go further and ask why for many a sevenmonth-old embryo is considered to be a possible victim of murder, while a
two-month-old one is not. The reason might be found in the fact that the
seven-month-old looks like a human being (we would recognize it as one),
and if born prematurely could, without strangeness, be held to be an object of
love on the part of the parents. A two-month-old fetus, however, does not look
or behave like a child or adult and therefore would probably not be a possible
object of parental love.3
Of course, if people began to see their "children" at one and two months
as a matter of course (due perhaps to certain artificial incubation techniques
becoming widespread) this might change, and the range of human feelings and
emotions become extended to include fetuses in early stages of development in
their scope. This is an empirical question and one which someday might be
answered. Again, after becoming aware of the complexity of the fetus's makeup
including such things as its possession of a complicated and sophisticated
genetic code - people might come to look upon a fetus as not so completely
different from them, and therefore begin to regard it as human. Hence Noonan's
mention of genetic code, though ineffective if construed as an argument, is
perfectly valid if taken as an attempt to make adult humans realize the great
affinity between them and human fetuses at the moment of conception.
Up to this point I have neglected what some claim is the justification of
abortion on the basis of the need for population control. This is not to say
that this issue is irrelevant. I have been concerned, however, to focus on the
issue of abortion in a more limited context, as Noonan does, in an attempt to
clarify certain moral issues. Indeed the correctness or incorrectness of Noonan's
view will determine to what extent and in what way the pressures of population will constitute a legitimate justification for abortion.
I conclude, then, that only as human adults come to be familiar with and
feel similar to fetuses will abortion be thought of as a form of murder by the
great majority of people. This attempt to extend the notion of humanity to
3 This point was raised by Miss G. E. M. Anscombe in a seminar led by Professor
Noonan at The Catholic University of America, June 25, 1968.
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fetuses at the moment of conception is not unsound or incorrect or misguided
per se. However, to be effective it must be based on the realization that what
men consider to be human is very closely tied up with what humans take themselves to be. They decide the criterion for humanity; they do not discover it.
The decision is based upon what the deciders consider to be enough like them
to count as human. The decision therefore can be an informed one, to the
extent that it is based upon thorough and accurate knowledge by men of themselves. Once the need for this knowledge is recognized, discussions of the moral
status of abortion can be freed from metaphysical quarreling and moral dogmatizing. To the extent that a human being recognizes another being as like
him, to that extent he will treat him as human. Whether or not this could
ever be true or will ever be true of fetuses in the early stages of development,
whether in utero or not, is an open question. Professor Noonan's discussion,
at the very least, makes us consider and reflect upon the issue.
JOHN O'CONNOR

